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Abstract 
Current mobile authentication solutions put a cognitive burden on users to detect and avoid Man-In-The-Middle attacks. In this 
paper, we present a mobile authentication protocol named Mobile-ID which prevents Man-In-The-Middle attacks without relying 
on a human in the loop. With Mobile-ID, the message signed by the secure element on the mobile device incorporates the context 
information of the connected service provider. Hence, upon receiving the signed message the Mobile-ID server could easily 
identify the existence of an on-going attack and notify the genuine service provider. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Elhadi M. Shakshuki. 
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1. Introduction  
Traditional password based user authentication has well known security problems. In particular, even an 
unsophisticated and remotely-executed phishing attack can be effective for a simple password theft. Due to rise of 
phishing and related attacks, sensitive applications such as online banking increasingly prefer more secure 
authentication alternatives. Their solutions usually fall into a group called two-factor authentication. By having a 
secondary factor, user authentication not only depends on something-you-know but also on something-you-have. As 
a result, setting up a fake site for collecting user passwords is no longer sufficient to conduct a successful attack.  
There is a subtle but important difference between a phishing attack and a Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack. 
While a phishing site is static and passive, a MITM attack is an active attack conducted in real-time. Two-factor 
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authentication by itself does not provide protection against MITM attacks† [1]. There are some solutions (detailed in 
section 5) proposed against MITM attacks, but in practice they are either not effective or not widely deployed due to 
usability or other factors.  
One trend in recent years that changes the landscape of authentication is the rise of mobile devices. Last year, it 
was predicted that by the end of 2013 smart phones would overtake PCs as the most common Web access device 
worldwide [2].  Using the mobile device as the something-you-have factor in two-factor authentication is found to 
be more usable than carrying something else by many users.  However current mobile solutions (e.g., OTP over 
SMS and mobile signatures) share the drawback of failing to address MITM attacks. 
One key difference between mobile and fixed platforms is that a secure element is already available in most of 
the mobile devices.  For authentication purposes, we could use this secure-element (e.g., a SIM card) which is a 
tamper resistant hardware that is capable of storing credentials such as private keys and perform cryptographic 
operations securely without keys having to leave the card. 
Our Contribution in a Nutshell. By exploiting the signing capability with a secure element on a mobile device, 
we propose a mobile authentication protocol secure against MITM attacks. Up to our best knowledge, this is the first 
such effort in the literature.  
Organization of the Paper. Section 2 briefly overviews mobile signature solutions deployed in many countries 
as a secure two-factor user authentication method. Section 3 presents our new protocol named Mobile-ID. Section 4 
provides a security analysis and a comparison. Section 5 summarizes the related work and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Available mobile signature solutions 
Currently implemented mobile signature solutions for user authentication rely on qualified digital certificates. 
Qualified certificates are defined by the ETSI standards and issued by an authorized Certificate Authority. Recently 
ETSI has made a draft standard available for public review, which provides the framework for further 
standardization for the creation and validation of advanced electronic signatures (AdES) in mobile environments 
[13]. 
 
 
Figure 1. The operation of currently available mobile signature solutions for user authentication. 
In the available solutions the service is implemented on EAL4+ certified SIM cards. The certificate is activated 
over the air when the user has subscribed to the service. Public and private keys are generated for each certificate. 
The private key is stored on the SIM card. The public key is published in a directory. When the user requests access 
to a service, to authenticate him/her the service automatically pops up on the user’s phone and requests a signature. 
When the user enters his PIN, the signature is sent to the service provider over the mobile operator. Then, the 
service provider checks its validity and grants access to the service. Figure 1 presents a step-by-step operation of 
mobile signatures for user authentication.  
                                                          
† MITM attacks have many types. In the literature, one type is referred as real-time phishing attack in which a fake web site collecting user 
credentials attempts to use these in real-time on the genuine web site. 
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3. Mobil-ID specification 
3.1. Assumptions 
1. Mobile-ID is assumed to be functioning on the mobile medium similar to an identity card. Mobile-ID is 
utilized without any external card reader. A secure element (such as a SIM card, secure SD card, etc.) is targeted as 
the storage for credentials and processing unit for secure operations. Our main aim is to provide users a more usable 
and secure alternative to password-based as well as earlier mobile signature-based systems for mobile identity.  
2. We assume that the operating environment of Mobile-ID i.e., the mobile terminal is secure. The presence of 
mobile malware is an increasing threat to the mobile environment. There are a number of studies which could 
improve the security of authentication in the presence of mobile malware. For instance, studies based on TEE 
(Trusted Execution Environment) [3] and the similar work have the potential to establish a secure mobile 
environment. We assume that such a secure environment is already established. 
3. As a more special assumption regarding the security of mobile device, we assume that the digital signature 
feature is accessible only by the Mobile-ID application that could be implemented as a mobile browser plug-in. No 
other application is allowed by the mobile operating system to interfere with the communication between the secure 
element and the Mobile-ID application. 
4. We do not address privacy aspects within this study. 
5. While the presented protocol could easily be tailored as a more traditional authentication method not involving 
an authentication server, representing our expectation to a shift to the authentication-as-a-service paradigm we 
assume the existence of a Mobile-ID authentication server; thus, our solution is a three-party authentication protocol 
that can operate as a single sign-on solution. 
 
Figure 2. The operation of the Mobile-ID protocol secure against MITM attacks. 
3.2. Parties that take part in the Mobile-ID Protocol 
The following parties take part directly or indirectly within the proposed Mobile ID protocol: (i) User (U), (ii) 
Mobile phone or mobile terminal (M), (iii) Secure Element (SE), (iv) Service Provider (SP), (v) Mobile-ID Server 
(MIS). 
3.3. Preparation 
The following steps need to be followed before the execution of the protocol: 
1. U obtains a secure element (SE) with digital signature capability and inserts it into the mobile terminal (M). 
The public-private key pair within the SE is securely personalized and certified (which could be performed in way 
similar to the available mobile signature solutions explained in section 2).  
 
326   Kemal Bicakci et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  34 ( 2014 )  323 – 329 
2. U has installed a mobile browser plug-in (or a specialized mobile browser application) which allows for M to 
communicate with the MIS as well as with the SE. This plug-in implements the mobile terminal part of the protocol. 
3.4. Protocol steps 
The protocol steps outlined in Figure 2 are detailed below: 
 
1. U determines the SP that he/she wants to connect and enters the URL of the SP into the browser. A 
connection‡ is established from U's browser to SP. U clicks on the appropriate link within the web site of SP which 
allows him/her to login using Mobile-ID credentials. By this way, U chooses a MIS to log in. 
 
2. SP establishes a secure (encrypted and authenticated) connection to the MIS. For this purpose, SSL/TLS 
protocol could be used. SP redirects U to MIS over the secure connection.  
 
3. MIS sends to M a nonce value, which is to be signed after the required information which follows it. 
 
4. The signed nonce will be used to authenticate U. In order to generate a digital signature, U is required to 
present the correct PIN value. The PIN is entered by U to M. 
 
5. If the PIN value is correct, before the generation of the digital signature, context information is appended to the 
nonce value. The context information (CI) specifies the SP M is attempting to connect. The context information 
could contain the URL of the SP and additional components like IP address, hash of SSL/TLS certificate, etc… See 
[4] for the discussion of pros and cons of different types of context information§. The value which is signed and 
returned to the MIS is as follows: 
 
  SignatureU(nonce || CI), CI               (1) 
 
6. MIS performs signature verification. Additionally MIS verifies that the context information is correct. For this 
purpose MIS compares the information of SP which has performed a redirection in step 2 and the SP which U 
wishes to connect and sends the context information accordingly**. If the comparison is successful and the signature 
is verified, then MIS informs the successful authentication to the SP by a signed message.  Additionally, MIS 
redirects C to SP. The signed message contains the identity information of U (IDU), identity information of SP 
(IDSP) and time information (TI) for protection against replay attacks. The message is signed by MIS. The signed 
message format is as follows: 
 
  SignatureMIS(IDU || IDSP || TI), IDU, IDSP, TI                                    (2) 
 
7. SP verifies the signed message sent by MIS for the confirmation of successful authentication of M. 
4. Security analysis  and discussion 
In this section we present an informal security analysis of both earlier signature based solution and the proposed 
protocol against MITM attacks. 
Suppose that M has attempted a connection to a web site SP' which impersonates SP. SP' is a man in the middle 
i.e., SP' connects to SP as well as M.  
                                                          
‡ This connection is established over an encrypted channel. However we do not assume the existence of an authenticated channel. 
§ For instance using URL as the only context information is quite sufficient to avoid a real-time phishing attack. On the other hand, a pharming 
attack which poisons the DNS cache could not be avoided by the URL information. 
**
 As mentioned previously, our proposed solution also works if a trusted third party server does not exist. If the protocol does not involve a 
separate MIS and U is directly authenticated by the SP, the context information could be verified by SP instead of MIS.    
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1. With the mobile signature solution, since the SP’ connects to SP the information appended to the signature 
request (step 3 in Figure 1) contains the identity information of SP (e.g., URL information). This information is 
displayed to U who is expected to check whether it is as same as the connected party – SP’ - and if not decides not 
to enter the PIN. However it was shown in earlier work [5] that this type of user involvement is not reliable. If the 
user fails to notice the mismatch between SP and SP’ and enters the PIN, with the digital signature SP’ could 
impersonate itself as the legitimate user to SP. Keeping the user outside the security loop and preventing MITM 
attacks without any expectation for correct user behavior is a more desired approach from usable security point of 
view. 
2. With the Mobile-ID protocol, the information obtained by M and forwarded to MIS contains the context 
information of SP'. The context information obtained by MIS when SP connects to MIS would be different than the 
information of SP'. In step 6 of the proposed protocol, MIS detects this difference and therefore the attack is 
stopped. SP is warned which breaks the connection with SP', thus preventing the MITM attack without any user 
involvement. 
For a better understanding of the key difference between the two protocols, we provide the following example: 
Suppose Alice receives a phishing email that pretends to be her bank gbank.com but contains a link to the bogus 
site ggank.com. With her mobile device, she clicks on the link and opens ggank.com while thinking she is visiting 
gbank.com. The bogus site immediately opens a session on the real bank website gbank.com to impersonate Alice 
and commit a fraud. Since Alice chooses to use Mobile-ID, the bogus site has no choice but to mimic it on the real 
site. Then, the real bank web site establishes a secure connection to MIS to authenticate Alice. MIS obtains a signed 
message from Alice's machine which contains the information that Alice is connected to ggank.com. MIS could 
easily see the mismatch between the real and bogus web sites and informs gbank.com for this incident. As a result, a 
real-time phishing attack is prevented.  
 
4.1. Communicating with Secure Element 
 
Regarding accessing the signing capability of the secure element (SE) on mobile devices, we identify two use 
cases:  
Remote communication with SE: In the mobile signature solutions described in section 2, the mobile operator 
establishes a communication with the secure element (SIM card) remotely (using encrypted SMS messages) 
bypassing the mobile terminal. Regarding the content of the signed message this approach has the advantage of 
being immune to a malware on the mobile terminal. However, it rejects any opportunity to append any context 
information prior to signing i.e., the context information of the connected service provider is available only locally. 
Local communication with SE: On the other hand, as we have seen, accessing the SE from a local application 
offers the advantage of realizing a protocol secure against MITM attacks. The downside is that now security of the 
mobile environment becomes an issue of concern.  
We note that the former approach does not eliminate the need for a secure client platform. For instance, a 
malicious software running in the background on the client machine could generate a fake transaction after the 
authentication step is completed [10].   
A disadvantage with the later approach is that Mobile-ID protocol could only work if the user accesses the 
service using his/her mobile device. The existing solutions allow users to access services using other devices such as 
a PC and the use of mobile device could be only for the digital signature generation.   
We believe the trade-off between local versus remote communication with SE is interesting and requires further 
investigation. We finish this section with a short discussion on the use of a Mobile-ID server in the Mobile-ID 
protocol.  
 
 
4.2. Mobile-ID Server 
The use of a Mobile-ID server allows users to consolidate their digital identities. Users may register with their 
preferred server and then use it for authenticating themselves to any web site which accepts the Mobile-ID protocol. 
Actually, the described Mobile-ID protocol resembles to the OpenID standard [11]. The main difference is that 
while OpenID standard specifies an authentication-neutral protocol but in practice usually depends on passwords 
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shared between users and the server, the Mobile-ID protocol represents a public-key based authentication protocol in 
which the users and the server do not share a long-term secret (the password).    
5. Related Work 
In the literature, there are many proposals to replace traditional password based authentication.  Bonneau et al. 
[6] performed a comprehensive and comparative evaluation of 35 of these according to 25 criteria grouped under 
security, usability and deployability properties. Interestingly, in their work prevention of MITM attacks was not one 
of the security criteria. We attribute this choice to the difficulty of taking an effective precaution against MITM 
attacks. 
Traditionally, MITM attacks are considered not to be avoided by the design of a user authentication protocol but 
by authenticating the server. In theory, server authentication is straightforward with the SSL/TLS protocol. The 
underlying assumption of SSL/TLS protocol is that the server public key is certified by a trusted third party. If such 
a certification does not exist, the common approach implemented in many browsers is to warn users against a 
possible security breach. If the warning message is ignored by the user (and we know many of them do so [7]), then 
a MITM could easily be conducted.  
An overview of mobile authentication solutions and approaches in European countries could be found in [8]. 
None of these solutions have addressed MITM attacks. 
A recent work by Ben-David et al. [4] addresses MITM attacks by contextual one-time passwords (XOTPs). In 
their solution, a XOTP device communicates with the browser over Bluetooth. A shared key is used to generate one-
time passwords cryptographically entangled with the session context. Our Mobile-ID protocol is similar to XOTP in 
the use of context information to avoid MITM attacks but eliminates the need to set up a communication between an 
external device and the browser.   
Security is usually an arms race. Given the resistance of two-factor authentication against standard phishing 
attacks, attackers start exploiting MITM attacks. See [9] for an example.  
6. Conclusion 
User authentication could be broken by malicious software running on the client machine and by attacks 
performed remotely from the network. If trusted platforms for mobile devices could provide the trust environment 
eliminating the attacks exploiting the insecurity of the client machine, we should expect the change of the threat 
picture and the rise of even more sophisticated network attacks such as MITM attacks. 
Many solutions for MITM attacks rely on users’ awareness. However since human error is the main source of 
security failures, a solution performing its function automatically without user involvement is desired. In this work, 
we propose Mobile-ID, a protocol which prevents MITM attacks while keeping the human outside the security loop 
[12]. The proposed protocol carries the context information of the man in the middle from the mobile client to the 
Mobile-ID server which then compares this information with the information belonging to the intended service 
provider and stops the protocol by notifying the mismatch. We are currently working on implementing the Mobile-
ID protocol and integrating it with the OpenID standard. 
References 
1. B. Schneier, “Two-Factor Authentication: Too Little, Too Late,” Comm. ACM, vol. 48, no. 4, Apr. 2005, p. 136. 
2. http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2209615, Last access: 04/04/2013. 
3. http://www.globalplatform.org/mediaguidetee.asp, Last access: 04/04/2014.  
4. A. Ben-David, O. Berkman, Y. Matias, S. Patel, C. Paya, M. Yung: Contextual OTP: Mitigating Emerging Man-in-the-Middle Attacks with 
Wireless Hardware Tokens. ACNS 2012: 30-47 
5. M. Alzomai, B. AlFayyadh, A. Josang, A. McCullag, An Experimental Investigation of the Usability of Transaction Authorizationin Online 
Bank Security Systems, Proc. of Australasian Security Conf, Jan 2008.  
6. J. Bonneau, C. Herley, P.C. van Oorschot, F. Stajano. The Quest to Replace Passwords: A Framework for Comparative Evaluation of Web 
Authentication Schemes. IEEE S & P, May 2012. 
329 Kemal Bicakci et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  34 ( 2014 )  323 – 329 
7. J. Sunshine, S. Egelman, H. Almuhimedi, N. Atriand L. F. Cranor. Crying Wolf: An Empirical Study of SSL Warning E 
ectiveness. Usenix Security, 2009. 
8. Mobile eID, Stork Work Item 3.3.6, https://www.eid-stork.eu/, Last access: 04/04/2014. 
9. http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/04/19/anatomy-of-a-phish-how-to-spot-a-man-in-the-middle/, Last access: 04/04/2014. 
10. C. Jackson, D. Boneh, and J. Mitchell. Transaction generators: Root kits for web. In 2nd USENIX Workshop on Hot Topics in Security 
(HotSec’07), pages 1–4. USENIX Association, 2007. 
11. OpenID standard, http://openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-2_0.html, Last access: 04/04/2014. 
12. L.F. Cranor, A framework for reasoning about the human in the loop, In Proceedings of the 1st Conference on Usability, Psychology and 
Security, USENIX Association, 2008. 
13. ETSI, Rationalised Framework of Standards for Advanced Electronic Signatures in Mobile Environment, Draft SR 019 020 V0.0.4, 2013. 
 
